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Topic of this talk
System Call Based Anomaly Detection
Detecting intrusions using system call flows w/ data models
Applications
Kernel
1. run applications into processes
2. intercept system calls
3. create models of good system calls
4. flag deviations to detect anomalies
Let's take a look at a simple, generic example.
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System Call Based Anomaly Detection
A set of models is created based on certain features of the system calls
Applications
Kernel
Models of good system calls
M1 MnM2 M3
System Call Based Anomaly Detection
Models estimate feature values observed in “good” system calls
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Models of good system calls
MnM1 M3M2
Example of models
— string length
— number of arguments
— function name
— string character distribution
System Call Based Anomaly Detection
Estimations become more accurate as more system calls are analyzed
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System Call Based Anomaly Detection
Also, models based on sets of system calls can be constructed
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System Call Based Anomaly Detection
Knowledge about system calls’ context is learned
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System Call Based Anomaly Detection
In detection mode, the same models can be used to spot malicious system calls...
Applications
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Detection of bad system calls
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System Call Based Anomaly Detection
...or malicious execution contexts
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Training and detection may be
more complex, but the basic
idea is the same.
The systems we analyzed
Different Approaches: Deterministic vs. Stochastic
We analyzed two anomaly detectors based on different approaches
FSA-DF [IEEE S&P 2006]
I Deterministic
I Control-flow: FSA
I Data-flow: unary/binary
relations
S2A2DE [IEEE TODS 2009]
I Stochastic
I Control-flow: Markov-chain
I Data models: clusters
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Deterministic Data-flow Anomaly Detection
The system calls generated by each process are examined
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Different PCs means different process states
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A system call changes the process’ state...
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...and so forth
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Deterministic Data-flow Anomaly Detection
This analysis is repeated until termination
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Deterministic Data-flow Anomaly Detection
A network of unary/binary data-flow relations on top of the process’ FSA
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M3elementOf{WR}
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Deterministic Data-flow Anomaly Detection
Other types of relations
I Unary: capture properties of a single argument.
I equal
I elementOf
I subsetOf
I range
I isWithinDir
I hasExtension
I Binary: capture relations between two arguments.
I equal
I isWithinDir
I contains
I hasSameDirAs
I hasSameBaseAs
I hasSameExtensionAs
Major Drawback: False Positives
Mostly due to the deterministic relations
open(“/tmp/php1553”, 0, 0x1b6) = 5
unary elementOf({/tmp/php1553, /tmp/php9022})
open(“/tmp/php9022”, 0, 0x1b6) = 5
What if “/tmp/php1990” is found?
These false positives occur pretty often.
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Finding similar system calls
— anomaly scores [ACM TISSEC 2006] based on
certain features of the arguments
— distance metrics [ACM TODS 2009] used to cluster
similar system calls
— each application's process creates different clusters
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Stochastic Behavior Profiling of Processes
Clusters of similar system calls interconnected by Markov-chains
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Markov-chains encode process behavior
— transitions between system calls can occur
with different probabilities [ACM TODS 2009]
— a call is anomalous if either there is no matching
state (i.e., cluster) or transition probability is violated
Major Drawbacks: False Negatives
Mostly due to the stochastic nature of Markov-chains
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I different paramenters → different results
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Clustering
I clustering depends on configuration parameters
I different paramenters → different results
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No valid threshold can be found if cycles are not of fixed length.
For instance, DoS attacks may not be detected.
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First contribution:
combination of the two approaches
Combining Complementary Approaches
Deterministic control-flow + stochastic data models
Hybrid IDS
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Combining Complementary Approaches
The learning algorithm is similar to that used in FSA-DF
I learn string domains
I ∀couple〈syscalli−1, syscalli 〉 ∈ {TrainingSet}
I make state
I learn relations
I equal save model of similar strings
I elementOf save model of similar strings
I subsetOf
I range
I isWithinDir
I hasExtension
I isWithinDir
I contains save model of similar strings
I hasSameDirAs
I hasSameBaseAs
I hasSameExtensionAs
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Paths And Filenames
How to find groups of good strings into execve/open/read/... args?
/var/log/http.0 . . . /etc/ftp.conf . . . /tmp/php1231
. . . /var/run/nfsd.pid . . . /etc/smb/samba.conf
. . . /opt/local/lib/libncurses.a . . . /usr/lib/libkmod.a
. . . /tmp/uscreens/427.ttys000 . . . /var/db/ntp.drift . . .
Self-Organizing Map
Type of artificial neural network, trained using unsupervised learning to
produce a multi dimensional discretized representation of the input space
of the training samples, called map.
Idea
I SOM to capture classes of good strings.
I Model of good strings → nodes.
I Similar strings → neighbor nodes.
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Paths And Filenames
Integration in Hybrid IDS - algorithm
I create SOM of all paths
I SOM initialization with linux directory structure.
I Extract all the paths from the syscalls
I SOM training [Kohonen 2004] with a randomized subset of the
paths.
I ∀couple〈syscalli−1, syscalli 〉 ∈ {TrainingSet}
I make state
I learn relations
I if syscalli−1 contains a path argument
find BMU from the SOM
add BMU to the edge
I subsetOf
I range
I isWithinDir
I hasExtension
I isWithinDir
I hasSameDirAs
I hasSameBaseAs
I hasSameExtensionAs
Second contribution:
improved system call models
Improved System Call Models
New models to reduce false detections
I Goal 1: Resillience to spurious strings in the datasets.
I Long/short strings in the training data can bias interval based
models.
1
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150 35
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I Goal 2: Detect simple DoS attacks.
I i.e., process forced to execute the same code region until crash.
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Argument Length Using Gaussian Intervals
Yields to less false positives
Statistics: to estimate the
distribution of args length
I |args| = Xargs ∼ N (µ, σ2)
I Sample Mean, Sample
Variance.
Model precision parameter:
I Kurtosis γˆX =
µˆX ,4
σˆ4X
− 3
I If γXargs < 0 the sample is
spread on a big interval
 0
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P(
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x
Norm(29.8, 184.844)
Thresholds: [12.37, 47.22]
Anomaly threshold: percentile Targs centered on the mean.
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Integration in Hybrid IDS - algorithm
I create SOM of all paths
I ∀couple〈syscalli−1, syscalli 〉 ∈ {TrainingSet}
I make state
I learn relations
I save BMU
I subsetOf
I range save string length or num. value
I isWithinDir
I hasExtension
I isWithinDir
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Mitigating DoS Using Edge Frequency Models
Yields to less false negatives
Given that:
I each FSA edge is traversed
a variable number of times
over multiple executions
I the traversal frequency has a
range
S1
S3
S2
Idea: estimate a validity interval to detect DoS attacks.
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The Model
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I freqs = Xfreqs ∼ Beta(α, β)
I Estimated α and β
I Interval from x-th percentile
I Not estimated if few values available
Mitigating DoS Using Edge Frequency Models
Integration in Hybrid IDS - algorithm
I create SOM of all paths
I ∀couple〈syscalli−1, syscalli 〉 ∈ {TrainingSet}
I make state
I learn relations
I save BMU
I subsetOf
I save string length or num. value
I isWithinDir
I hasExtension
I isWithinDir
I hasSameDirAs
I hasSameBaseAs
I hasSameExtensionAs
I save edge traverse count
How We Built The Evaluation Dataset
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Accuracy Evaluation
No false negatives (deterministic control-flow) + almost-zero false positives (stochastic
data models)
sing mt-daapd profdtpd sudo BitchX mcweject bsdtar
Traces 22 18 21 22 15 12 2
Syscalls 1528 9832 18114 3157 107784 75 102
S2A2DE 10.0% 0% 0% 10.0% 0.0%
0.0% 8.7% S2A2DE
FSA-DS 5.0% 16.7% 28% 15.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% SOM-S2A2DE
Hybrid IDS 0.0% 0% 0% 10.0% 0.0%
Table 2. Comparison of the FPR of S2A2DE vs. FSA-DF vs. Hybrid IDS and S2A2DE
vs. SOM-S2A2DE. Values include the number of traces used. Accurate description of
the impact of each individual model is in Section 4.2 (first five columns) and 4.3 (last
two columns).
4.3 Specific Comparison of SOM-S2A2DE and S2A2DE
We also specifically tested how the introduction of a Symbol SOM im-
proves over the original probabilistic tree used for modeling the path
arguments in S2A2DE. As summarized in right side of Table 2, the FPR
decreases in the second test. However, the first test exhibits a lower FNR
as detailed in the following.
The mcweject utility is affected by a stack overflow CVE-2007-1719
caused by improper bounds checking. Root privileges can be gained if
mcweject is setuid. The exploit is as easy as eject -t illegal payload,
but we performed it through userland exec [16] to make it more silent
avoiding the execve that obviously triggers an alert in the S2A2DE for a
missing edge in the Markov chain. Instead, we are interested in comparing
the string models only. SOM-S2A2DE detects it with no issues because
of the use of different “types” of paths in the opens.
An erroneous computation of a buffer length is exploited to execute
code via a specially crafted PAX archives passed to bsdtar (CVE-2007-
3641). A heap overflow allows to overwrite a structure pointer containing
itself another pointer to a function called right after the overflow. The
custom exploit [16] basically redirects that pointer to the injected shell-
code. Both the original string model and the Symbol SOM models detect
the attack when the unexpected special file /dev/tty is opened. However,
the original model raises many false positives when significantly different
paths are encountered. This situation is instead handled with no false
positives by the smooth Symbol SOM model.
4.4 Performance Evaluation and Complexity Discussion
We performed both empirical measurements and theoretical analysis of
the performance of the various proposed prototypes. Detection speed re-
I sing - write on arbitrary file (data-flow).
I mt-daapd - arbitrary code execution (data-flow + DoS).
I proftpd - arbitrary command exeuction (data-/control-flow).
I sudo - arbitrary command execution (control-flow).
I bitchx - arbitrary code execution (control-flow + DoS).
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decreases in the second test. However, the first test exhibits a lower FNR
as detailed in the following.
The mcweject utility is affected by a stack overflow CVE-2007-1719
caused by improper bounds checking. Root privileges can be gained if
mcweject is setuid. The exploit is as easy as eject -t illegal payload,
but we performed it through userland exec [16] to make it more silent
avoiding the execve that obviously triggers an alert in the S2A2DE for a
missing edge in the Markov chain. Instead, we are interested in comparing
the string models only. SOM-S2A2DE detects it with no issues because
of the use of different “types” of paths in the opens.
An erroneous computation of a buffer length is exploited to execute
code via a specially crafted PAX archives passed to bsdtar (CVE-2007-
3641). A heap overflow allows to overwrite a structure pointer containing
itself another pointer to a function called right after the overflow. The
custom exploit [16] basically redirects that pointer to the injected shell-
code. Both the original string model and the Symbol SOM models detect
the attack when the unexpected special file /dev/tty is opened. However,
the original model raises many false positives when significantly different
paths are encountered. This situation is instead handled with no false
positives by the smooth Symbol SOM model.
4.4 Performance Evaluation and Complexity Discussion
We performed both empirical measurements and theoretical analysis of
the performance of the various proposed prototypes. Detection speed re-
I sing - write on arbitrary file (data-flow).
I mt-daapd - arbitrary code execution (data-flow + DoS).
I pr ftpd - arbitrary c mmand ex uction (data-/control-flow).
I sudo - arbitrary command execution (control-flow).
I bitchx - arbitrary code execution (control-flow + DoS).
Performance Evaluation
Not-so-negligible overhead, but mostly due to ptrace
sing sudo BitchX mcweject bsdtar Avg. speed
System calls 3470 15308 12319 97 705
S2A2DE 0.4 0.8 1.9 0.1 0.1 8463
FSA-DF 1.3 1.5 1.2 - - 7713
Hybrid IDS 29 5.8 27.7 - - 1067
SOM-S2A2DE - - - 8.8 19 25
Table 3. Detection performance measured in “seconds per system call”. The average
speed is measured in system calls per second (last column).
sults are summarized in Table 3. The datasets for detection accuracy
were reused: we selected the five test applications on which the IDSes
performed worst. Hybrid IDS is slow because the BMU algorithm for the
symbol SOM is invoked for each system call with a path argument (opens
are quite frequent), slowing down the detection phase. Also, we recall that
the current prototype relies on a system call interceptor based on ptrace
which introduces high runtime overheads, as shown in [2]. To obtain bet-
ter performance, an in-kernel interceptor could be used. The theoretical
performance of each engine can be estimated by analyzing the bottleneck
algorithm.
Complexity of FSA-DF During training, the bottleneck is the binary
relation learning algorithm. T trainF = O(S ·M +N), where M is the total
number of system calls, S = |Q| is the number of states of the automaton,
and N is the sum of the length of all the string arguments in the training
set. At detection T detFSA−DF = O(M +N).
Assuming that each system call has O(1) arguments, the training
algorithm is invoked O(M) times. The time complexity of each i-th it-
eration is Yi + |Xi|, where Yi is the time required to compute all the
unary and binary relations and |Xi| indicates the time required to pro-
cess the i − th system call X. Thus, the overall complexity is bounded
by
∑M
i=1 Y + |Xi| =M · Y +
∑M
i=1 |Xi|. The second factor
∑M
i=1 |Xi| can
be simplified to N because strings are represented as a tree; it can be
shown [2] that the total time required to keep the longest common prefix
information is bounded by the total length of all input strings. Further-
more, Y is bounded by the number of unique arguments, which in turn
is bounded by S; thus, T trainF = O(S ·M +N). This also prove the time
complexity of the detection algorithm which, at each state and for each
input, requires unary and binary checks to be performed; thus, its cost is
Conclusions and Future Works
Solve performance issues due to SOMs
I determinisitc models accurately capture the control-flow
I stochastic models accurately capture data-flow features
I a hybrid approach lowers false detections
I performance issues:
I the optimization of BMUs lookup is the first item on our
TODO list
I the use of a faster system call interceptor the second one ;)
